I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Division, Eleventh Army Corps.

GENERAL: About the part taken by the division under my command in the operations of the Army of the Potomac from April 27 to May 6, I beg leave to report as follows:

I deem it unnecessary to speak of the marches we executed previous to our arrival on the battle-field of May 2, as my division marched along with the corps without any separate action. I will only say that all orders were executed by officers and men with promptness and alacrity, and that the men marched better, were in higher spirits, and endured the fatigues and hardships of the march by night and day more cheerfully than ever before. I have never known my command to be in a more excellent condition.
The division arrived at the junction of the Orange Court-House Plank road and the old turnpike in the afternoon of April 30. I was ordered to go into camp, facing west, on the open ground near Hawkins' farm. The disposition I made of my forces is shown on Diagram No. 1.

CAMP OF THE THIRD DIVISION on April 30.
DIAGRAM No. I.

SECOND POSITION OF THE THIRD DIVISION on May 1.
DIAGRAM No. II
 

In this position the division remained until noon, May 1, when we received marching orders, which, to the disappointment of the troops, were countermanded immediately afterward. I then was ordered to take a position facing south, connecting with the First Division, under General Devens, on my right, and the Second Division, under General Steinwehr, on my left. I placed General Schimmelfennig's brigade on my right, connecting on his right with General McLean's brigade, of the First Division, and ordered Colonel Krzyzanowski to occupy my left, to connect on his left with Colonel Buschbeck's brigade, of the Second Division. The dispositions I made are shown in detail on Diagram No. 2; in addition to which I have to observe that the two regiments forming my extreme right were ordered by me to be placed in column on the open field immediately on the left of General McLean's brigade, so as to give them liberty of movement, but that they were drawn back behind the fence and deployed in line of battle on the old Turnpike road, as I understand, by special directions from headquarters. Behind my Second Brigade, Colonel Krzyzanowski, I placed a strong reserve, so as to be able to assist Colonel Buschbeck, whose line was at the time very thin. The Eighty-second Ohio I kept farther back, as a general reserve. My pickets were at a suitable distance in front, south of the Plank road, connecting with those of General Devens on the right and General Steinwehr on the left. Captain Dilger's battery was placed at the junction of the two roads, commanding the Plank road, the valley below, and the woods beyond.

The firing we heard all along the line of the army during the day seemed to indicate that the enemy was feeling our front in its whole length. Toward evening the enemy began to throw shells from two pieces placed on an open space in the woods opposite General Devens' left, but doing no injury. This fire was not replied to by our artillery.

General Schimmelfennig received the order to send forward one regiment to capture or drive away those pieces. A short but lively skirmish ensued, in which some of our men were wounded, and the officers commanding the expedition returned with the report that the pieces had already been withdrawn. A subsequent reconnaissance proved this to be true. A negro was brought in from a farm near the place where the guns had stood, and reported that he had seen some rebel troops moving westward; but the information he gave us was very indefinite.

Meanwhile my chief of staff, Major [Ernest F.] Hoffmann, was ordered by you to superintend the construction rifle.pits along our whole front, facing south. Pioneers and fatigue parties worked all night, and at daybreak the rifle.pits were nearly completed. General Schimmelfennig obstructed the wood road in his front, south of the Plank road, with abatis. The night passed off quietly, the troops of my division remaining in the position above indicated.

Early in the morning of May 2, General Hooker passed along the whole line, and was received by officers and men with great demonstrations of enthusiasm.

As the general disposition made of the rest of the corps had great influence upon the part taken by my division in the action of the evening, I beg leave to say a few words about the distribution of the forces of the First and Second Divisions in connection with mine. The extreme right was occupied by General Devens' (First) brigade, under Colonel von Gilsa, consisting of the Forty-first, Forty-fifth, and Fifty-fourth New York, and the One hundred and fifty-third Pennsylvania. Part of this brigade (two regiments) was formed at an angle with the old turnpike, fronting nearly west. On the road itself one section of Captain Dieckmann's battery was placed behind an abatis. Colonel von Gilsa's left connected with General McLean's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-fifth, Fifty-fifth, Seventy-fifth, and One hundred and seventh Ohio, and the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers. This brigade was formed in line of battle on the old Turnpike road, with one regiment in second line and one detached as a reserve for Colonel von Gilsa. Four pieces of Captain Dieckmann's battery were pieced near General McLean's left, on open and high ground.

Immediately east of Talley's farm, where General Devens had his headquarters, General McLean's left connected with my right, consisting of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania and the Sixty-first Ohio, of General Schimmelfennig's brigade, deployed in line of battle on the road, having an embankment in their front and the thickest kind of pine undergrowth immediately in their rear; on their left the Sixty-eighth New York, of the same brigade, also in line of battle; the sharpshooters of the brigade in the little piece of woods between the two roads east of the open field flanking the line; the Eighty-second Illinois and the One hundred and fifty-seventh New York behind General Schimmelfennig's left, in second line, connecting with General Schimmelfennig's left; the One hundred and nineteenth New York, of my Second Brigade, occupying the southern border of the little piece of woods above mentioned; then Dilger's battery; the Fifty-eighth New York in the church grove; behind the interval the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, and farther to the left the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, in second line, and the Eighty-second Ohio still farther back, as above stated. On the left of Captain Dilger's battery commenced Colonel Buschbeck's brigade, part of which was deployed in the rifle-pits; Captain Wied-rich's battery, from which two pieces had been detached to General Barlow's brigade, stood near Colonel Buschbeck's right on high ground. On the left of Colonel Buschbeck, General Barlow's brigade, with one section of Captain Wiedrich's battery. Farther to the left, troops of other corps. A rifle-pit was constructed, running north and south, on the west of the eminence east of Dowdall's Tavern. The Reserve Artillery, which arrived in the course of the day, was placed on that eminence.

This position was, in my humble opinion, a good one to move from if the army had followed up the offensive, which, no doubt, had originally been contemplated. As a defensive position it presented a front only moderately strong to resist a parallel attack coming from the south. I say moderately strong, as the line, especially on our right, was very thin, and we had no general reserve. But if this position was intended to protect the right and rear of the army, a look at the map will show that it lacked some of the most essential requisites. Our right wing stood completely in the air, with nothing to lean upon, not even a strong échelon, and with no reliable cavalry to make reconnaissances, and that, too, in a forest thick enough not to permit any view to the front, flank, or rear, but not thick enough to prevent the approach of the enemy's troops. Our rear was at the mercy of the enemy, who was at perfect liberty to walk right around us through the large gap between von Gilsa's right and the cavalry force which was stationed at Ely's Ford, and which, at all events, had no considerable power of resistance. If it was really the intention that we should act on the defensive and cover the right and rear of the whole army, our right ought to have been drawn back toward the Rapidan, to rest on that river, at or near the mouth of Hunting Run, the corps abandoning so much of the Plank road as to enable it to establish a solid line. As we were actually situated, an attack from the west and northwest could not be resisted for any length of time without a complete change of front on our part. To such a change, especially if it was to be made in haste, the formation of our forces was exceedingly unfavorable.

It was almost impossible to maneuver some of our regiments under fire of the enemy, hemmed in as they were on the old turnpike by embankments and rifle-pits in front and thick woods in the rear, drawn out in long, deployed lines, giving just room enough for the stacks of arms and a narrow passage; and this old Turnpike road was at the same time the only line of communication we had between the different parts of our front. Such was the position occupied by the Eleventh Corps on May 2.

In the course of the forenoon I was informed that large columns of the enemy could be seen from General Devens' headquarters, moving from east to west on a road running nearly parallel with the Plank road, on a ridge at a distance of about 2 miles or over. I observed them plainly as they moved on. I rode back to your headquarters, and on the way ordered Captain Dilger to look for good artillery positions on the field fronting west, as the troops would, in all probability, have to execute a change of front.

The matter was largely discussed at your headquarters, and I entertained and expressed in our informal conversations the opinion that we should form upon the open ground we then occupied, with our front at right angles with the Plank road, lining the church grove and the border of the woods east of the open plain with infantry, placing strong échelons behind both wings, and distributing the artillery along the front on ground most favorable for its action, especially on the eminence on the right and left of Dowdall's Tavern. In this position, sweeping the open plains before us with our artillery and musketry, and checking the enemy with occasional offensive returns, we might have been able to maintain ourselves even against superior forces at least long enough to give General Hooker time to take measures according to the exigencies of the moment. Soon afterward we were informed that two divisions of General Sickles' corps were to attack in flank and rear the column of the enemy which we had seen marching, and you were requested to detach one of your brigades for their support. This weakened the force you might have used as a general reserve very materially.

In the absence of orders, but becoming more and more convinced that the enemy's attack would come from the west and fall upon our right and rear, I took it upon my own responsibility to detach two regiments from the second line of my Second Brigade, and to place them in a good position on the right and left of the Ely's Ford road, west of Hawkins' farm, so as to check the enemy if he should attack our extreme right and penetrate through the woods at that point. This was subsequently approved by you. The regiments I selected were the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin. The Seventy fifth Pennsylvania had to relieve the pickets of the Second Brigade, and was replaced by the Fifty-eighth New York. The Eighty-second Ohio I placed at some distance behind the left of the Fifty-eighth New York. The disposition of my troops was then as shown on Diagram No. 3, and, no orders reaching me, it remained so until the battle commenced. With these exceptions, no change was made in the position occupied by the corps.

Brigadier-General Schimmelfennig, commanding my First Brigade, made several reconnaissances in his front and that of General Devens, especially on the Plank road and through the wooded country south of

it ; but these reconnaissances, made with infantry, were necessarily confined to a limited compass, and brought no other fact to light but that the enemy's skirmishers were found at a distance of 1½ to 2 miles in considerable number.
Meanwhile we heard General Sickles' artillery, but the firing did not continue long, so that it seemed as if the attack on the flank and rear of that column of the enemy which we had seen marching toward our right had been checked or given up.
It was between 3 and 4 p.m. when the section of artillery attached to Colonel von Gilsa's brigade gave two discharges, followed by a short musketry fire. We hastened to the front, and received the report that only a few rebel cavalrymen had shown themselves on the old turnpike, and that the artillery had fired without orders. All became quiet again. I ordered General Schimmelfennig to push another reconnaissance up the Plank road. The instructions he received from headquarters were to the effect that he should avoid everything that might bring on an engagement. The reconnoitering party returned after some time with the report that they had heard the yells and shouts of a large number of men behind the enemy's line of skirmishers. The cavalry, which had been attached to your command but a few days before, and whose business it was to clear up our front and flank, repeatedly reported that at some distance from our pickets they had been fired upon, and that then, of course, they could go no farther. Immediately before the enemy rushed upon us, a reconnoitering party of that cavalry went into the woods in front of the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin; returned after about ten minutes, and informed the officers of the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin that it was all right, and then went quietly to rest behind Hawkins' farm.

It was nearly 6 o'clock when we suddenly heard a sharp artillery and musketry fire on our extreme right. I at once ordered all regiments within my reach to change front. The One hundred and nineteenth New York I took out of its position in the woods, facing south, and formed it near the junction of the Plank road and the old turnpike, facing west. The Sixty-eighth New York received the order to occupy the western edge of the same piece of woods, the southern border of which had been occupied by the One hundred and nineteenth. On the right of the One hundred and nineteenth formed the One hundred and fifty seventh New York, then the Eighty-second Illinois, and farther to the right the Eighty-second Ohio, the latter receiving from me the order to cover the left of the Fifty-eighth New York, to fire one volley if the enemy should break through the woods in front, and then to make a bayonet charge. The Fifty-eighth New York and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, on the extreme right, remained as they were, under the immediate command of Colonel Krzyzanowski. Captain Dilger, commanding my battery, drew his pieces back to the high ground, near Wiedrich’s battery, and opened upon the columns of the enemy as soon as they showed themselves on the old turnpike.

To change the front of the regiments deployed in line on the old Turnpike road was extremely difficult. In the first place, they were hemmed in between a variety of obstacles in front and dense pine brush in their rear. Then the officers had hardly had time to give a command when almost the whole of General McLean’s brigade, mixed up with a number of Colonel von Gilsa's men, came rushing down the road from General Devens' headquarters in wild confusion, and, worse than that, the battery of the First Division broke in upon my right at a full run. This confused mass of guns, caissons, horses, and men broke lengthwise through the ranks of my regiments deployed in line on the road. While this was going on, several men of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, which formed my extreme right, were shot from behind, the enemy having already penetrated into the woods immediately in the rear of our original position. It was evident that under such circumstances it was an utter impossibility to establish a front at that point. The whole line deployed on the old turnpike, facing south, was rolled up and swept away in a moment. If the regiments had remained as they were at first formed, in column on the open field, it would have been easy to give them a correct front by a simple wheeling, and the turmoil on the road would not have disturbed them. As it was, the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania and the Sixty-first Ohio Regiments, which I had counted among the best I had, and which had never been guilty of any discreditable conduct, could do nothing but endeavor to rally behind the second line.
This second line, as above described, had changed front, and was formed behind a rise of ground between the church grove and the woods, from which the enemy was expected, but every evolution was attended with the greatest difficulty, as the scattered men of the First Division were continually breaking through our ranks.

In my extreme right, where the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin and the Fifty-eighth New York stood, things wore a similar aspect. A short time after the attack had commenced, a large number of men of the First Brigade, First Division, came running back through the woods, the enemy following closely on their heels. Captain [Frederick] Braun, commanding the Fifty-eighth New York, fell from his horse, mortally wounded, immediately after having deployed his regiment. The enemy was, however, received at that point with great firmness. The Fifty-eighth New York, a very small regiment, exposed to a flanking fire from the left, where the enemy broke through, and severely pressed in front, was pushed back after a struggle of several minutes. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, flanked on both sides and exposed to a terrible fire in front, maintained the unequal contest for a considerable time. This young regiment, alone and unsupported, firmly held the ground where I had placed it for about twenty-minutes; nor did it fall back until I ordered it to do so.

There is hardly an officer in the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin who has not at least received a bullet through his clothes. Had it not been for the praiseworthy firmness of these men the enemy would have obtained possession of the woods opposite without resistance, taken the north and south rifle-pit from the rear, and appeared on the Plank road between Dowdall's Tavern and Chancellorsville before the artillery could have been withdrawn. The order to fall back to the border of the woods behind was given to Colonel Krzyzanowski in consequence of the following circumstances:

The tide of fugitives had hardly subsided a little on our left, when the enemy's columns, preceded by a thick cloud of skirmishers, presented themselves on and to the right and left of the old turnpike. My regiments had hardly had time to change their position and to wheel into the new front, under what difficulties I have above stated. They had just formed behind the little rise of ground in front of the church grove when the enemy's columns issued from the woods.

The enemy's front of attack, as we saw it, extended considerably beyond our extreme right. His regiments were formed apparently in column by division, the skirmishers throwing themselves into the intervals whenever their advance was checked. The enemy was formed at least three, perhaps four, lines of columns deep, the intervals between lines being very short, the whole presenting a heavy, solid mass.

It was observed by Captain Dilger that several regiments marched from Talley's farm by the right flank down to the Plank road and the low ground south of it, so as to envelop our left. The Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, which was on picket, was thus taken in the rear, and in its dispersed condition found itself, of course, obliged to fall back, its line of skirmishers, which was facing south, being driven in from the flank or captured. The regiment lost a number of men killed and wounded and a good many prisoners, among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Matzdorff.

As the enemy emerged from the woods, the regiments of my second line stopped him with a well-directed and rapid fire. Colonel Peissner, of the One hundred and nineteenth New York, a gentleman of the highest order of character and ability, and an officer of great merit, was one of the first to fall, pierced by two bullets.
The enemy was gaining rapidly on the left of the One hundred and nineteenth, which was then exposed to a very severe enfilading fire. The line fell back step by step to the neighborhood of the church grove, facing about and firing as it yielded. Meanwhile the batteries of Captains Dilger and Wiedrich had kept up a rapid fire, first with spherical case, upon the enemy's columns as they descended from Talley's farm, and then with grape and canister. In and on both sides of the church grove the regiments halted, to make another stand.

Colonel Hecker, of the Eighty-second Illinois, fell, wounded, from his horse while holding the colors of his regiment in his hands and giving the order to charge bayonets. Major Rolshausen, of the same regiment, who then assumed command, was wounded immediately afterward.

The Eighty-second Ohio was directed to draw farther to the right, and to occupy the projecting angle of the woods on the right and rear of the church grove; but, while executing this order, one of your aides directed him to occupy the right of the north and south rifle-pit, where the regiment established itself.

About that time one of Colonel Krzyzanowski's aides came to me, asking for re-enforcements, as the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, being nearly enveloped on all sides, could no longer maintain its position. Having no re-enforcements to send, I gave the order to fall back to the border of the woods east of the open ground. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin then marched in retreat in good order, facing about and firing as often as possible.

Meanwhile the enemy, after having forced back the One hundred and nineteenth New York by his enfilading fire, gained rapidly on the left of Captain Dilger's battery. This battery and that of Captain Wiedrich remained in position until the very last moment. Captain Dilger limbered up only when the enemy's infantry was already between his pieces. His horse was shot under him, as well as the two wheel horses and one lead horse of one of his guns. After an ineffectual effort to drag this piece along with the dead horses still hanging in the harness, he had to abandon it to the enemy. The conduct of this brilliant officer was, on this as on all former occasions, exemplary.

The enemy was now pouring in great force upon our right and left, and the position in and near the church grove could no longer be held. The two regiments still remaining there gave several discharges, and then fell back in good order. Arriving near the north and south rifle-pit, General Schimmelfennig ordered the Eighty-second Illinois to charge into the projecting corner of the woods on the right, the border of which was already in possession of the enemy. The One hundred and fifty-seventh was directed to fall back along the Plank road, so as to clear the front of the rifle-pit, which seemed to be well filled with men, and to take position on the border of the woods behind. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin had, in the meantime, been very severely pressed on the extreme right, and there the regiment lost somewhat its compactness, the woods being very thick and the wing companies becoming detached. It was at that moment when I rejoined you behind the rifle pit, which was manned in the center by some of Colonel Buschbeck's regiments; on the left by several companies of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, Sixty-first Ohio, and One hundred and nineteenth New York, and on the extreme right by the Eighty-second Ohio. Several pieces of the Reserve Artillery were still firing.

Behind the rifle-pit there was a confused mass of men belonging to all divisions, whom we made every possible effort to rally and reorganize, a thing extremely difficult under the fire of the enemy. I succeeded once in gathering a numerous crowd, and, placing myself at its head, led it forward with a hurrah. It followed me some distance, but was again dispersed by the enemy's fire. One of my staff officers was wounded on that occasion. I tried the same experiment two or three times, but always with the same result.

The enemy advancing on our right and left with rapidity, the artillery ceased firing, and soon the rifle-pit was given up. The Eighty-second Ohio maintained itself very bravely there until the whole of the rifle-pit was abandoned. The loss of that regiment on this spot was very heavy. It was then after 7 p.m.

The retreat now became general, and the confusion increased as the troops marched through the woods. The One hundred and fifty-seventh New York, still in good order, stopped several times, firing and charging upon the pursuing enemy.
Captain Dilger had sent his battery toward Chancellorsville, keeping one piece with him, which he brought several times into action with very good success during the retreat of the corps. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, Eighty-second Ohio, One hundred and fifty-seventh New York, and the Eighty-second Illinois halted on the right of a line occupied by what was supposed to be General Berry's division. There they remained until about 8.30 p.m., when they retreated farther, to an open space north of Chancellorsville.

After 9 o'clock, the order reached them to march to the rallying place of the Eleventh Corps, west of the Chancellor house. I rallied large fragments of several regiments partly behind the abatis in the woods, partly a little farther back, near the creek west of the Chancellor house. It was about 9 o'clock when I marched with them to the general rendezvous. The corps was reorganized before 11 o'clock.

Early on the morning of May 3, I was ordered to relieve General Humphreys' division, on the extreme left of the army, near Scott's Mills. Nothing happened in my front except a little skirmishing.
At about 11 p.m. I was relieved by the Twelfth Corps, and then took position behind the First Division, which was deployed in the rifle-pits, our right resting on the Second Corps.

In the course of the 4th, my division took a more concentrated position, five regiments being deployed in the rifle-pits and five in column, in the second line, on the extreme right of the corps. Nothing but light skirmishing in our front. So my division remained on the 5th.

Early on the morning of the 6th, we recrossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, together with the rest of the army. On the evening of the same day, I reached my old encampment, near Stafford Court-House.
The losses suffered by my division in the action of May 2 were very severe in proportion to my whole effective force. I had 15 officers killed, 23 wounded, and 15 missing, and 102 men killed, 365 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 953.(*) Of those reported as missing, a good many have already been found wounded in the hospitals, and it is probable that a large proportion of them were left killed or wounded on the battle-field. My whole loss amounted to about 23 per cent.
In closing this report, I beg leave to make one additional remark. The Eleventh Corps, and, by error or malice, especially the Third Division, has been held up to the whole country as a band of cowards. My division has been made responsible for the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, and the Eleventh Corps for the failure of the campaign. Preposterous as this is, yet we have been overwhelmed by the army and the press with abuse and insult beyond measure. We have borne as much as human nature can endure. I am far from saying that on May 2 everybody did his duty to the best of his power. But one thing I will say, because I know it: these men are no cowards. I have seen most of them fight before this, and they fought as bravely as any. I am also far from saying that it would have been quite impossible to do better in the position the corps occupied on May 2; but I have seen with my own eyes troops who now affect to look down upon the Eleventh Corps with sovereign contempt behave much worse under circumstances far less trying.

Being charged with such an enormous responsibility as the failure of a campaign involves, it would seem to me that every commander in this corps has a right to a fair investigation of his conduct and of the circumstances surrounding him and his command on that occasion. I would, therefore, most respectfully and most urgently ask for permission to publish this report. Every statement contained therein is strictly truthful, to the best of my information. If I have erred in any particular, my errors can easily be corrected. But if what I say is true, I deem it due to myself and those who serve under me that the country should
know it.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                                                 C. SCHURZ,
                                                                                     Major-General, Comdg. Third Division, Eleventh Army Corps.
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD,
Headquarters Eleventh Corps.